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failsafe communications, or better weapon systems. Little
thought is given to how the decision maker processes the data
in order to make effective decisions. Several computerized
decision aids have been suggested to fill this gap. One of
these aids, Operations and Intelligence (OPIMT) is evaluated
to assess its utility as a computerized decision aid in C3
applications. OPINT is an on-line, interactive, real-time
decision aid which assists decision makers by prescribing
a straightforward normative procedure for organizing and
analyzing difficult decision problems. The results of the
experiment show that OPINT aids in the decision making process,
but has some severe limitations as it currently exists.
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intelHooncf^) orocess» th^ decision Ta<ina process/ anj the
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Llnfor^'unatelyf the majority of t*^e resources soent in the
iTiDToveTent of these svst-^ms are exoen^ea in either
orovinino hetter Tata oatherinq, failsafe communicationsf or
better wearon svste'^s. Little thought is given to how the
decision T^Ke'" orocesses the "fata in oroer to '"al<e effective
decisions. Several comcuteri?ed decision aids have been
suaoested to fill this cao. One of these aifiSf noerations
and Intelligence (OPJ-jT) is evaluated to assess its utility
as a C0Ticuteri7Pi decision aid in C5 aoolicatigns. OPIJT is
an on-linPf interactiver real-ti'rie decision aia whici^
assists decision .-nakers by prescrihing a straiahtforward
noriiative procedure for oroanizina and analyzing fiifficult
decision orooleTs. The results of the experiment shew t^^at
OPI^.'T aids in t^^e decision Taking orocess/ but has some
severe limitations as it currently exists.
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T. OESCPTPr iri^' OF OFCISIOiN AM^LrSlS
Durina tiTes of crisis on war/ the^e is orohablv no
field of enrieavor like rriilitarv and strategic command and
control wHere decisions are made cjuicklvf but under
conaitions of risk and extreme uncertainty. This is
especially tru^ since acct.ira^'e inforn^ation on all ascects of
a crcolem are almost always concealed from decision makers.
Every military force tries to conceal itself and r s<(^s every
attemot to deceive the ooposinq decision maker as to its
intentions. facts surround inq the tactical situation are
elusive/ especially those concerning the enef^y. These tyoes
of decisions/ 'hen/ are difficult and freauently would seem
to defy a systematic decision makino process (Decart'^ent of
the Army/ 1^8 0/ o, 3-2), At the same time* there is no
arena in which bad decisions have more traqic results. The
cost of making errors can orow exoonentially mainly due to
the complex r e 1 a t
i
onsn i ps and resulting chain reactions/ or
the errors could cancel themselves out and the costs not Pe
imrnediately known (Turban and N'eredith, 1^77/ o. U),
Conseai^iently/ while decision makers must recognize that
orderly/ rational decision makina procedures are difficult/
they must at the same time constantlv strive to base
decisions on the most rational thoucjht process possible. To
reduce error prooabilitv/ and for the sake of survival*
decision makers must oecome more sophisticated (Turban ana

'''eredith, \^1 1 , o. 5). They must learn to utilize new
tools and techninues that are heina developed. '^io one could
inr!;^'4ine a successtui suraeon utilising equioTient ano
orocedures froTi the turn of tne century. Yet/ in decision
•na<inQ» you can still find aecision makers using the tools
and techniaues of that tine.
Military and strateoic decisions are not only Tiade
under conditions of uncertainty (where not all facts are
av/ailanle) and stress^ they ^re also rarely considered
^inal. The ev^r changing situation brings with it the
regui^enen^ to continuously revise. acoraisalSf estinr>ates/
ano oerhaos decisions. Tnis occurs since decision making is
based on t^e future but is deoendent on the oast. For
yearsf manaqors have considered decision making to he a Dure
art 01" talent which is acquired over a long oeriod of time
through exoerience or trial and error. It has been
consioered an art recause a wide variety of individual
styles can oe useq in aooroachino and successfullv solving
tne same tvoe of or'^hlpms. One woul.^ r, ori^ally base these
styles on creativity/ judgm, ent/ intuificn/ and experience
rather than some sort of systematic methoa (Turt)an and
^^ereditn, 1977, n. 5).
Decision making as a discipline han its origins in
operational analysis techniques beqinninq in I'lorld tiac II
(/nlliams/ 1*^^78, o. 12), These techniques were tyoically
acplied to special tyoes of clfar-cut, reoetitive problems/
such as those of systematic search and resource allocation.

Sincp the I'^bO'Sf However/ a more qener^l tecHnoloqy
has eTierqeo tor incosinn loaical structure en the reasoning
thst underlies any sn=>cific decision. Fiis technolooy is
decision analysis (Barclay et a1.» \9 7 7 , p. iv). Since
1°70, there has been a Tiajor effort by defense agencies to
adoot this technoloqv to their dav-to-day decision making,
f^any have found it a way to make better^ more defensible
decisions.
Decision analysis is a quantitative method which
oermits the svstematic evaluation of the costs or benefits
accruim from courses o^ action that might be tai<en in a
decision oroblem (Barclay et a)., 1^77/ d. vi). The method
includes the ioentification of the alternative choices
involved, the assignment of values (costs/ r-)enefits) for
Dossible outcomes, ancj the expression of the orobahility of
those outcomes occurring. Once this is done, the orobable
aain or loss associated with each alternative can be
determined bv systematically combinino the probabilities and
values.
In addition to the primary role of decision analysis as
a method for the loaical solution of complex decision
problems, it also has several additional advantages as well.
The formal structure of decision analysis insures all the
elements, their relationships, and their associated weights
have heen consioereo in the decision problem. The model of
the decision problem can serve an important role in
facilitatina communications between those involved in the

decision orccess. '^Iso it is very easy to identify the
areas of disaareeT'enf, their relative inportancef and if
they ac*:u3lly have any n^ateria! iTtoact on the indicated
decision. Firi3|]y, when changes occur in the orcblemf it is
relatively easy t-o reenter the existim problem structure to
chanoe values or to a'^d or remove orotlem dimensions as
reauireo (Barclay et al./ \^11 , o , vii).
It should bf* e"nDhasi7ed that in no sense does decision
analysis renlace decision makers or the role of human
judoment in decision rnakina. Intuitive^ implicit^ or
judamental decision makina is» after all^ the mainstay of
the experienced decision maker and for good reason.
Intuitive un-aided methods have tyoically served the
decision r^^'Kfir well? and he/she can reflect on some personal
history of productive reliance on their developing intuition
(Brinxers^ 1^7?, p, 1*^1). There is considerable evidence
to show that unaided decision rrakina is reasonablef
effective^ anrj reliable ("^eterson and Beach/ 19b7f pp.
?q-a(b). However, what rjecision analysis does, is nrovide an
orderly ani more easily understood structure that helos to
aaqregate the wisdom of experts on the many tooics that may
be needed to make a decision/ and then suooort the skilled
decision maker by orovidinq him with sound techniques to
suoolement and ensure the internal consistency of his
judgment .
Complex lecision problems are often qifficult to
resolve. This occurs for a number of reasons. Oct ions are
10

not always clee'^ly aefine'i. ^ny results which may be
derive^ frcr. the selection of a Particular option Tiay be
hiahlv uncertain. Also# it is otte'^ aifticult to :Jeternine
relative creferences tor the c^ossinle aecision outco^ies.
'/'he'^ orobleTs such as these do occ^ r , the decision maker
norrrally takes steps to structure the orohlen^ and reduce it
to a Tiore explicit forrn. This is exactly what decision
analysis does.
decision analysis Ouilos uoon four Pasic ele^^ents whicn
aro inherent in any 'decision Droblem (I.^arc1ay et al.# 1977^
o. I). The use of these four elen^ents allows for a s^iooth
procedure in the resolution of complex decisions. The four
elements ere
:
t. A set of initial courses of action. You must
have more tnan one alternative or there is no
decision to be made. All possible alternatives
snould be considere(i without reqard to
plausibility at this ooint.
•?. The Dossiole conseaijences of each initial act.
These must be considered. What are the
important thinas that can happen that will make
one act more valuable or worth more than another
act? Relevant seauences of subsequent events
an^ -follow -UP acts must be identified for each
initial act,
3. How attractive or unattractive is each
11

co'^se'aijence o^ each act? How desirable or
undesirahlp is cop outcc^e comoared to others
wnich ,Tn-j.-!ht: r^sijlr froT ^'^e sai^e or a'^otner
decision.
'4. How likely is it tl^a^ a oarticular act will
res 'J It in each o^ the conseauences. Tnis
oroOabilitv or uncertainty can be measureo as a
crocaoility fro'T^ to 1 or in the form of odds.
These four eleTients^ as oescribed^ orovide a way to
orqanize/ ouantify/ and trace the logical i-noli cations of
the decision. Ihe primary oojective is to provirle a model
of at least oart (all would be best) of the cjecision. The
use of the woro Todel i "^ this case "leans to represent the
decision in a Quantifiable form.
It is a central oreceot of oecision analysis that all
relevant consi"iera»:ions in a oecision can oe represented
fully in a decisiori diai":raT! (Barclay et al.f 1977» o. 2).
Tnis decision liagra'^ will show everythinq a decision maker
feels is relevant to the problem in question. A decision
diagram consists essentially of a network of branches
corresponding to Possible sequences of acts and events^
fanninq cut from^ an origin at the left to a time horizon at
the riqht. Acts are available choices. Events are possiole
occurrences which are partly or completely outside the
decision maker's control^ though the chance of one of them
hapoeninq may be influenced by acts which were carried out
12

earl i e r
.
Tne Tecision •iianraT' crgchic^lW 'listinquishes acts
frof^ events. Act for<s -^r? reoresenteci by sou a res ana event
f o r '< s are represented by circles as shown in Fiqure 1.
These act forks and event forks are then comhine:J to
form a decision tree. An exatiole of a tree is shown in
Fiqure ? , T-iis decision situation involves a cc^oany which
rnust flecil'^ whothor to bid on two orojectSf ^^ anri H, The
decision on croject ^ must be maoe nrior to the aecision on
B.
This <,iecision diaqrarr depicts all the ocssicle acts and
pvents and shows how these relate to each other in the
decision situation. v hile the representation would help a
decision maker to see at a nlance his alternatives and
inentify those thinos t'^at mioht affect any choice to be
rrade» It does not yet answer the central Question: which
choice should be made? That question can not be answered
without" consi'ierim tne value of the possible outcomes and
the likelihood of occurrence of the events. In order to
show how this is incorporated into the decision models let's
return to the oiidinq exaTiple. Let's say it has been
calculated it will cost '5 10, to prepare a bid for either
project. If the bid on A is won, a qain of 5 50,000 will be
realize f^. Projec'' 6 will also return a oain of fSOrOOO if
the bid is won hut nue to overhead, will onlv return a Qain
of B2^,0 00 if bio A is also won, Tne decision tree now


































FIGURE 3: DECISION TREE WITH VALUES ADDED
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the diaore-" are the oath values. These values are the sum
of the costs and gains a1onT each oath.
^iC ^ f o ccToletio the oiaa^sTi/ we nee a to oortray tne
cieqree of uncertainty about the events- we cannot control^
soecifically whether a oiH is won or lost. Based uoon orior
exoerience^ it is judneo t-hat the bid on oroject A is
eduallv likelv to be won or lost (orobability ,S win/ ,5
lose). If A is won, the cron?bility of winning the bid on B
is reduced to , ^ . '-'owever, if '^ is lost, the chances of
winnim ^ increase to .7, and if ^ is not bid on, the
chances for 6 are .o to win. Adding these values leaves our
diagram looking like ^idure '^ *
This diagram should now be a virtually ccTolete
translation or mogel of the rercection of the decision Taker
of the decision nroble'^. All that is left now is to
dpterrrine which is the best solution. The Tiethod to do this
involves tne calculation of weighted values, often called
exoec^'ed va'ues, for each decision ootion. This technigue
is the si'^olest and s^'atistically ^ost straightforward
method that can oe used. Care Tust be taken however, since
frequently there are decision circumstances wherein an
expected value solution to a decision oroblem may not be an
ootimal one. In thpse cases, alternative means of treating
value ^re required and will be discussed later,
Ceterminina a value for eac^ act in a decision is done
by a orocedure called folding back the decision diagram.



































FIGURE 4: DECISION TREE WITH PROBABILITIES ADDED
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at the riqhr-hanT side of tHe niagram. At eacH event fork/
the exoected value of that event is calculatei by
multiolvim th<? value of each nossible outco^^e by the
orobabilitv of the occurrence of that outcome. At eacn act
fork/ the act witn the hiohest value is the one which should
aive the oest decision. The crocess of substitution is
continued until the initial act fork is reached. Figure 5
denicts this nroce'^urp. Therefore the decision rT.a'<er would
bid on "jroject '*^/ then if he /<<on tne hig/ not bid on Project
R. If he lost the oi'i on A, he would Did on project B.
Thus far in tne discussion of decision analysis* the
values of the gains or losses were assigned in terms of only
one measure/ mon^sy. The outcomes were then comcared/ using
the exoected valu^/ very easily since it is easy for us to
relate to money as a value. However/ in most real life
situations/ esoeciallv those of the military/ gains and
losses ar pf not measured in money/ rather in terrain/
eguioment, caoabilities/ and even lives (i«'nlliams/ I'^l 6 f d.
?.2), These v^l'je dimensions are oualitative rather than
guantitative and are very difficult to measure. To further
cloud the issue/ each individual has his own oersonal
subjective values for each of these.
In addition/ verv seldom are these value dirnensions or
attributes civen egual weioht in a decision. For examole/
consiger the selection of a radio set from several comoeting
models. Cost mav oe an imcortant consideration/ but so are






























EV(7) = ( .4) (50K) +( .6) (30K) = 38K
EV(8) = ( . 7) (30K) + ( . 3) (-20K) = 15K
EV(6) = ( .6) (40K) + ( .4) (-10K) = 20K
EV(4) = LARGER OF 38K OR 40K = 40K
EV(5) = LARGER OF 15K OR -20K = 15K
EV(3) = LARGER OF 20K OR = 20K
EV(2) = ( .5) (40K) +( .5) (15K) = 27. 5K
EV(1) = LARGER OF 20K OR 27. 5K = 27, 5K
FIGURE 5 DECISION TREE WITH EXPECTED VALUES
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iTinortant each is requires aetemination, /'hat is imoortant
in the iTecision is which of these attricutes is more
i^nortant than tho r,f'-;ers and how is this difference scaled.
Then now oo the remainino atrrioutes fit on this scale. For
instance/ are cost and reliability eaually irnrortant? If
not f what exactly is the difference and how does the
decision rr^a^ e r make trade-offs between the two.
f^pferminaticns of this sort must {-e maoe for all attributes
and soT^ehow our mooel must ce an)e to comoare across these
many att'^ibutes and aaarenat'=> the results to inoicate the
best solution.
Proble.Tis of this nature have SDurretJ the cjevelopment of
multi-attrioute utility models (^'lilliams^ 197 8/ d. 2^).
These mcjels nelc to crovide a relative rankinq for
attributes and also crovide a common guide for aaoreqating
the measures into a sinale index of worth. This orocess
involves fhe assionment of a measure of utility or merit to
the attributes.
L'tility can be described as a subjective measure of
"Mkinq" (Parclav et al., \''^11 , o. 27). It is a personal
value reflecting how you subjectively value something. The
acolication of utility as a measure for the value of an
attribute or alternative was first orooosed by Von Neuman
and '^lorgenstern. Tf^ev suaoested that eacn individual has a
measurable preference among various choices available. The
preference they calleo utility and is measured in arbitrary
units called utiles (Von Meu'^an and '''oraenstern, 1'^'4 4^ p.
21

?7). Utility is base'1 on the conceot that in decision
Tskina/ ^ r-3'*son will choose that alternative y^hich
m^Yirri^^s nis or her ''xoected utility .
Multi-attrioijte utility tiodels have been used
extensively in the systen^s acauisition role (vvilliams/ 1978#
D. 2^). The oroceoures encouraae discussion among the
decision 'r^a^ er and his staf^, N o longer can cost be a
little Tiore iToortant than reliahility. It is now^ oerhaos/
ten utiles rore imocrtant. Once the values are assigned to
tne Tiodel* an'i a rest decision decioe''i uoon, the rrooel now
alloi/^s you to vary thp relative weiohts to see which ones
have the Tiost irnoact on the proposed solution. This is
called a sensitivity analysis and helos decision makers when
they are uncertain about the accuracy of their infor.-nation.
Decision analysis aoolies ^ayesian techniaues to place
a value on inforration that reouces uncertainty (Keen and
Scott ''Norton, I'^Th, c. ^i^). Bayesian techniques orovide
for-ral Tethcdolooies for analyzing the imolications of a
decision mat<'er's suojective judgn^ent of probabilities/
uodating these assp'ss Tents as additional information is
obtained. This aoditional information can result in one of
two events: either the uncertainty is comoletelv removed or
the additional information allows the rtecisicn maker to
revise the initial Corior) assessment of the probabilities
(Keen and Scott '^^orton, 1^7^, n. ab).
As stated earlier^ the use of decision analysis does
not reolace the decision ma^er but ados a new dimension to
22

his decision nnaKino caoabilities. It is also assum^'i the
use of tnese "lanual technioups could slow the decision
T^akinT oroaress consioerablyf est^ecially if a fear of
Tathof^atics exist-s. f^o^^l.lna'plY/ what has t^een develooed
are decision aids which areatly ease the coTiplexity
i n V o 1 V e cj
,
A decision aid is a human-syste^ interface desivqned for
the soecific ourrose of suDoort-inq ani enhancing a decision
Taker in his decision -rai^ina role (Keen ana Scott '^orton,
I'^T^f n, 58). It is a ton! for use by the decision maker.
Decision aids ^r^^ nor-nally stereo on connuters as tho use of
the cor^outer reduces all needs for calculations by the
decision ma<er and helos to SDeed the decision process.
The general availability of low cost/ high caoacity/
fast information orocessina technolooy has enabled man to
exten:) a-^d increase his intellectual cacacity. The effect
of this has been that man can now deal more effectively with
comolex matters on his own comolpx terms as aoainst the more
simolistic terms of pre-in'formation technoloay man
(Brinkers/ 1972/ p. 5). The focus is not on the com outer
itself/ but on the technolooy for dealing with the
information that is available and the scientific methods
which are in develooment and use.
The use of decision aios normally olaces increased
demands uoon human creativity and judgment rather than
relievino the decision maker of t ne need to exercise them as
mioht be exoected. This is because the availability and use
25

of oecisiof^ ^\ ^.3 which se^'ve as an extension of ti^e decision
maker's intellect- provide new an'i interestina ODoortunities
for usino nis inte11<=^ct. Decision ai^is helo the decision
T^aker ov orescrihina a straightforward norrrative crocedure
for oroanizinq and analv^ino difficult decision oroolems
involvina bot^ unce'"*'aintv about the outcome of future
events and oernlexity about the complex value tradeoffs
inv/olved in the choice of a course nf action (brinkerSf
l<?7^, o. 7) .
aa

TI. II3F PF ^-F^I^THN M^S .MTHiri ThF C^ AO^Ma
CoTimand, control en^ communications (C3) can De Jefined
as a orocess which orovides the commander (or
decision
maker) with a means of receiving information, making
decisions haseo on this information, and then imolementing
^^^ ^^.^^^Pinn the decision in or-^er to achieve his or her
mission C-oose, l^-^O). ^ C3 system includes the data
aatherino (or in^eHioenc-) crocess, t he dec i s i on mak i ng
process, and the oceratinq forces (or weaoons) reauired to
achieve the mission. A C3 svstem would look somewhat
like















\FORCE STATUS, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ^
FIGURE 6: C3 SYSTEM
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This figure sho'-^s i-hat data is qatneredf oossioly
thro u ah th<^ use of e^rly '/varnina raoars> ohotograohy, or
reoorts fro I-, .-^it-hin, ^n-i sent to a co"^-Tiancj center. Once
wit"hin the co'^rr^ncj center, the data is analvzeJ and a de-
cision is made reoardinn the use of weaoons or units. These
decisions are fhpo transTitted to the resoective units for
imrle'Tientation. Peduirements for data or inforrpation could
orioinate a*" the command center or it could he snontane-
ouslv oenerated as in thp case of a missile att'aci<.
(Jnfortunatelvf the majorit/ ("if net all) of the
resources soent in th» irporovement o 'f these systems are
exoendea in either orovidinq cetter data aatherina (such as
better ra^'ars)f failsafe communications/ or biqaer and
better weancns systems. These are all important aspects and
should fie i T Drove d, out this is also indicative of the lack
of aoorec iation for what must be done ^ith t-he data when it
is delivered to the command center. Little thouaht is given
to now the decision maker orocesses the the data. in order to
make effective decisions and forecasts.
The amount of data available today to decision makers
is mindboodlinq. PeaHsticallvr if methods for cognitive
information orocessina are not improved at the same rate as
our communications can provide it^ much, if not all of our
sophisticated communications technoloav will go under
utilized. /vhat is needed is more research aimed at
imcrovina our information manaoement/ decision making, and
forecasting utilizino tho aoplications available through the
2b

coTDuter ('inrjriole/ r^>^0, n. 1),
Decision Tiakcina lips 3t the he=irt of the C3 crocess
('Vpririole/ \''^^''jf o. 1?). The entire CS system focuses on
orov/i'iino ^ Teans to transmit all reauirpo data to the
decision maker anH then a mpans to transmit the aecision to
the reauired oarties. Therefore^ C3 svstems which do not
contain so^^e sort of decision making suooort should be
chall^meo because they ere inromolete.
'"'est Decision makers will begin with a need for some
bac<arouno inf'^rmation on the oroblem at h^nd. Has there
been a oroblem 1ik-e tnis oefore? How have the people
involved reacted in similar situations? Are there any
oeoole available who have exoerience in this area? These
are all e^^aTcles of the tvoes of Questions which will need
tobeanswered.
Nevtf tho decision n^aker will want all of the latest
facts Surround in d the oroblem. f'lho is availaole to move
into the area? *^ow lona will it take? .^iho is there
already? '.'hat forces does the oooosinc side have available?
v\hat is haooening now? These ancj many more are the
Questions surround 1 no the current situation.
Nowf the decision maker will want to know what the
oDtions are and what the adversaries options are. In
addition, will be the need to know of any activities, either
in orocess or oendinc/ whic^^ mav nave an impact on the
decision. Mext is the assessment of the orobabilities of
tne oossiole outcomes of these activities. The criteria
^7

which .pvill be USPH in analyzing the elternativ^^S must be
listen ar^'i relative ircortance weights for these deterTiined.
Finally the rjecisicn -na'x e r evaluates the alternatives and
selects a course of action to be followed.
How does ti^e decision Taker do all this/ esoecially
when the i-rcac^s of a wrona decision can be so costly? It
certainly can not be 'Jonp alone. The decision maimer must
relv on «-he aid of i^'ey staff members who have certain
exoertises in soecific areas. But even with comoetent
staffs^ the task is often too areat. Comoijterized decision
aids may be the only answer.
There are several reasons why comouterized decision
aids would oe useful in the C3 decision ma<ina crocess
(Alien et al./ 1976/ cc. 2-5 ). These reasons are:
1. It is an effective tool for improving the
dialooue amonq staff officers who are workinq
tooet'^er on a oarricular oroblem. It would be
heloful in eliminating misunderst'andinas.
2
.
The orocess of using a decision aid gives staff
officers ^he ocportunity to include what they
considers important in the analysis. Then they
can see how these factors actually imoact on the
solution,
3. It is very easv to evaluate several courses of
action. Variables which are uncertain can be




ii. Critical are=^s can now be 'ocui^ed on. ^ ] ] too
often, too Tuc^ ti-ne is waste ("i in discLJSsina or
arouino lAihat Tiav seem to be important points,
but turn out to be rather insignificant in the
final solution,
5. Tire Tiav no^u hp in your favor ratner than your
ooconent. ""'ost oeonle do not react well when
under tifre constraints. Peocle tend to over
reac*" to unimoortant eve'~'ts ann TiaWe auick and
hasty judT^ents. Decision aicts enable and force
the rjpcision Talker to follow a systematic
routine. Tnen the aid nerforms the necessary
calculations in a real time manner. This oives
additional ti'^e to either wait for additional
information or actively seek for it if the
analysis shoi»'S a neen.
There are numerous examples of C3 problems where
comPuteri7eT decision aids would be useful and the following
are some examolest
1. Decision aids can and are being used to monitor
earlv warning systems for any indications of
impending crisis. I^ is important to not allow
events to control us, but rather to possibly




?. ^ recent e x ^rvnl ^ c^nc»rne") t^e analysis of
r^Tfjorf^nt evacuation oostures that a cof^rnancier
was consiaerino in the face of uncertainty about
a develooinn crisis that cou1J have made it
necessary to -evacuate U.S. nationals from a
third country C ' '• iHiannSf 1^78, o. ^7 ) .
3. The nopTial continoency olanninq process that
constantly tai^es olace is another examcle
f ."- i ] 1 1 a m s , 1^7 ^ , D . ^ ^ ) . The o e c i s i o n aid
allocs you to easily olav the "what if" aame.
^ , Traininrj is another evar^ole. By allowinq staff
officers the chance to use the aids based on
past crises/ they beco-ne familiar with current
plans ana procedures and/ if realistically used/
become use'^ to oceratim in a crisis environment
(All en et a 1 . / 1 ^7o/ p. S) .
5. Decision aids may be used for establishing
policy. notions can be evaluated and tested
prior to deciding on firm policy.
6. Tne desian of new C3 systems would be another
example. /ihenever new systems are oesioned/
there is always a tradeoff of caoabilities
because of insLjfficient fundina. These aids
would helo determine the safest cuts in
30

caoahilities to he -na^e
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in. F X r s T T N G c 3 p: c I s 1 N a i o s
This chaotpr a escribes several C3 computer-oasea
information/ iecision^ and forecasting systems desioned to
HnK the human user with the information so critical to
efficient information manaaement.
Tnere oresently exists much too little emohasis uDon
tne content an -J esoociallv the form of the information and
data that flow thro u ah fS systems (Andriole* 1"^80/ o, 3).
The duestions of ho'^ the information should aooear to the
user, how the information should be stored/ retrieved/ and
manipulated/ ano ho^ the ever increasino amounts of
information can be comprehended by the user have not been
adeauately dealt- with uo to this point. The three
comouter-oas'^d information systems described below were
developed with thes«» auestio^s in mind. Each is aimed at
helpinT tho C^ svston users deal with the enormous a^^^ount of
information for which thev are responsible. Tne systems
were developed with the human user in mind and thus exploit
and supplement existinq human information processing
caoab i 1 i t i es
,
Soatial Oata Base '"''anaaement - The use of normal data
base management systems/ from the perspective of the
occasional user, are difficult and inefficient (Andriole/
1980/ p. 3J, Recently/ research has produced a prototype
spatial data management system which enables users to
12

hierarc^^ically storer rptrieve^ and maninulate data through
tne use of soatiel controls (^noriole/ 19 '^O, p. a). These
soatial controls allow the user access to data -without the
need or uS" of the conventional keyboard. Instead/ the
soatial controls oenmit access to data using numerous
navaoational aidS/ such as colore location (in an electronic
worksoace orojected on a large screen displav)» touch, and
sound. ScecificaMv/ t'^e user "nay store and retrieve the
data accord in o to /vhere he or she finris it Tost easy to
access .
The soatial da^ a nn.^naaeT. ent systeTi was develooed in
accordance with the way hu^ians normally store and retrieve
information. For examolef in a normal office environment,
oeoole store information in familiar claces according to
freduencv of use, imoortance, shaoe, size^ ana so forth.
The orototvne soatial data base manaoement system uses these
osychological oredisoositions by allowing the user to create
his or her own osvcholooical wori^snace ancj oroject it onto a
laroe ^isolav. This oisplay then is interactive and caoable
of storing all tyoes of data to i nc 1 uae numeric/
ohotooraphic, and even audio. Tt is also easy to update.
The user is then able to manipulate and retrieve data by
movina throuah the workspace with joysticks or touch
sensitive disolav oenels. Figure 7 shows the hierarchical
data oraanization principle. Figure ^ shows a user
positioned in *ront of a soatial data base management
system. Figure ^ shows the joystick and touch pane) mounted
33

FIGURE 7 : HIERARCHICAL DATA STRUCTURE
(Andriole, 1980, P. 5)
3a










FIGURE 9: DATA ACCESS CONTROLS
(Andriole, 1980, P. 6)
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in the arr of a user's chair. Data is accesseri by touchino
a specific noint in fhp lA/ork-soace or the touch-sensitive Pad
ao'j/or hy Tiovino the joystic'< for'>/ar'i or oacl<waro (to ascend
Of" f^esceno into the hierarchically orcsanizea aata base).
A^iaotive C3 Information Selection - In resoonse to the
ever* increasinq inforfnation require nients olaced upon
intelliaence officers responsible for analyzing and routing
infomation, the '^daotive Infor-riation Selector CATS) was
developeo (-'adni et al., l^y^, d. 1-3). Durinq this
developT'ent orocesSf it ^as determined that "new C3
techniques are re-.^uiren to control inforrnation flow so as to
best match svsten- capability with human characteristics in
the Tan-comouter interaction".
The ^IS process is as follows. The system user is
calibrated during a training phase to determine how and why
some messaqes (pieces of information) are selected for
further analysis and some are rejecten. This is performed
for eacn in 'J i virtual- user such that he or she has a
personalized infor-^ation manageTient sorting ^ routino/ and
Gueuina syst'^m.
i/^ihat haooenSf in effect/ is the computer monitors the
user and then internalizes how the user selects and rejects
information. Once fhe training program is accomplishedf the
computer emulates thp user and automatically selects*
routes* and queues the information. Thus the AIS may be
viewed as an information management assistant capable of
relievino its superior from some of the burdens of
57

i n f o rti ^ t i on overloa'i.
jhe fu 'actions a^^n elements nf an A IS are presented















FIGURE 10: ADAPTIVE INFORMATION SELECTION
SYSTEM CONCEPT (Andriole, 1980,
P. 8)
The AIS has been develooed for use where C3 information
is already in an electronic form. The AIS is designed to
suDcort areas .^hich are already comolicated w i t »^ too nnuch
incoming in^orTation for the human user to handle. The AIS
is merely a computer nroaram /^hich provides helo to the C3
system user.
Ultra-Rapid Readina - Even if systems such as soatial
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6s t a base mgnaoenent ann AIS c^jn auic<lv orovi'le access to
nepTe'i intofnation, t-n*^ user -nust still roao anrj cofricrehena
the infoPTi^f-ion fioforp furthpr ac^'ion can be contemolater).
SoDSeau^ntly/ r='searc^ has oeen perforrreri to imorove the
soeed with which users can rean and comorehend fAndriolef
1980, DO. ^-11).
A technique knoi«n as raoi.i serial visual presentation
(^SVP) has c'^'^n oeveloneo and conouterized for use in C3
svstei^s. The text is presented one Aord at a time on a


















FIGURE 11: ULTRA-RAPID READING
(Andriole, 1980, P. 10)
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Research has in-iicoted that sinole f^SVP sentences can
be rea'-J ^n^i accjr-it-oly recalle-i when si^own at a rate as hiah
as \ i wons OPT secorif which is twice as fast as oeople
normany r^a-i f^ntter et al./ 1 '^ 7 ^ , o. 1).
h?eadinQ sneed and coTicrehension is a -^unction of t^e
time it tal^es for the eves to transrrit to tHe brain and the
brain's ability to orocess. The ultra-ran id reader was
oeveloned to shorten th^ time between the eyes and the
brain. It does this ov reoucinq eye rpovexent to a bare
'pinirru''. The eves do f^ot need to ^love bac'< and forth or ud
ana down, as is norTally done/ since the text a
c
pears on the
C^^T in the saTip location. In addition/ substituting some
oictures or symbols for woros has increased comorehension.
However/ as wit^^ AIS/ the text must oe in electronic form to
be read u 1 t r a - r a c i cj 1 y .
The orecedina three research desians were directed
towaro imnrovioT the information flo« to the decision ma'<er ,
The ne*t three examples are computerized necision aids which
are desianed to be used primarily during crisis situations.
Each thermits the user to select and retrieve history on past
crisis situations. The best way to describe each is by
providinq a samole of the types of Queries which are
allowed. The first/ as a escribed in Figure 12 f enables a
user to retrieve and prescribe crisis actions (or responses)
and objectives. The second aidr as shown in Fiqure 13/
enables a user to focus on the manaoement problems which
occurred durinc oast crises. The third aid enaPles a user
ao

to examine 307 crises involvino the U.S. between l^ata and
1^7fo, 33 Fiaijro l^'-l sho^s.
These ails were develooeti in direct response to
reauests fro-" crisis manaqers for so'-.e tyne of on-line
analytical assistance (Anciriole. '^ay-June 1979, d. IS).
Crisis rranaqers are now able to assemble, sort, and analyze
crisis rranaae^ent data on a real time basis. Preliminary
nerformance tests of these aids suooest they might increase
the ran':!e of oction neneration and evaluation dunna crisis
hy 100% and reduce oast search case time by 50%.
THIS SECTION IS DESIGNED TO ASSIST DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL IN
EVALUATING PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION AND SETS OF U.S. OBJECTIVES BASED
ON DATA FROM 101 CRISES INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN 1956-1976.
THE USER IS GIVEN THREE LEVELS OF ANALYTIC ASSISTANCE:
1. THE CAPACITY TO SEARCH FOR HISTORICAL CASES WITH
SETS OF USER-SPECIFIED U.S. ACTIONS OR OBJECTIVES.
2. THE CAPACITY TO IDENTIFY, ACROSS ALL CASES.
THOSE ACTIONS THAT HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN
MOST STRONGLY ASSOCIATED WITH EACH OBJECTIVE
SELECTED BY THE PROGRAM-USER;
3. THE CAPACITY TO IDENTIFY, ACROSS ALL CASES.
THOSE ACTIONS THAT HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN MOST
COMMONLY ASSOCIATED WITH SETS OF U.S. OBJECTIVES
SELECTED BY THE PROGRAM-USER.
WOULD YOU UKE TO SEE A SUMMARY OF ANOTHER SYSTEM SECTION?
PRESS Y' OR 'N' AND RETURN'.
Y
ENTER T. 'II'. OR '111'.
II
FIGURE 12: CRISIS MANAGEMENT DECISION AID
(Andriole, 1979, P. 16)
ai

THIS SECTION PERMITS A DETAILED EXAMINATION OF MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
ENCOUNTERED IN 41 SELECTED CASES 11956-1976).
MAJOR PROBLEM CATEGORIES ARE:
1. SYSTEM-RELATED DELAYS IN DECISION-MAKING
2. SYSTEM/PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS ON ACTIONS
3. LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED
4. RESOURCES INADEQUATE FOR DECISION-MAKING/ACTION
5. INTELLIGENCE FAILURES AT DECISION-MAKING LEVEL
6. EMOTIONAL/IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN DECISIONS
7. INTERPERSONAL FACTORS IN DECISION-MAKING
8. PROLONGED CRISIS PROBLEMS
9. PROBLEMS IN SELECTING ACTION PERSONNEL
10. CONSTRAINTS ON OPERATIONS
11. PHYSIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS FOR OPERATING FORCES
12. INFORMATION FAILURES BY OPERATING FORCES
13. FAILURES IN TAKING APPROPRIATE/TIMELY ACTION
14. FORSTAT PROBLEMS
15. PROBLEMS IN THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
16. GENERAL PROBLEMS IN CRISIS PLANNING
17. GENERAL PROBLEMS IN CRISIS HANDLING
18. GENERAL PROBLEMS IN CRISIS TIMING
WOULD YOU UKE TO SEE A SUMMARY OF ANOTHER SYSTEM SECTION?
PRESS 'Y' OR 'N' AND RETURN'.
Y
ENTER r. Ml', OR 'III'.
ill
FIGURE 13: CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROBLEM ANALYZER
(Andriole, 1979, P. 17)
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THIS SECTION PROVIDES ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON 307 CRISES (1946-1976).
THE DATA MAY BE SEARCHED FOR CASES MATCHING THE USER'S SPECIRCATIONS.
OR A FULL DESCRIPTION MAY BE PRINTED FOR ANY SELECTED CASE.
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION CODED FOR EACH CRISIS ARE:
YEAR AND BRIEF DESCRIPTION
LOCATION OF CRISIS
'nature OR PRE-CRISIS ACTIVITY
DURATION OF PRE-CRISIS PERIOD
SCOPE OF CRISIS (DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL)
NATURE OF CRISIS (MILITARY. POLITICAL.BOTH)
CRISIS DURATION
TIMING OF CRISIS RESOLUTION
CRISIS OUTCOME
ANTICIPATION OF CRISIS
DEGREE OF THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS
TIMING OF THREAT DEVELOPMENT
TIME AVAILABLE FOR DECISION




WOULD YOU UKE TO SEE A SUMMARY OF ANOTHER SYSTEM SECTION?
PRESS 'Y' OR 'N' AND 'RETURN'.
N
FIGURE 14 CRISIS DESCRIPTOR
(Andriole, 1979, P 17)
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Ourim crisis sifuat-ionSf decision rnai<.ers strive to
react swi^tlv/ deci"*? '-/iselvf and coTimunicdte accurately.
Tnis requires c1os«= coordination with their staffs and the
aCility to overcome certain odstacles such as oressures from
time constraints* amhiouity of qoals* and the monorolization
of time with information collection. Some of the problems
of information collection f^ a\/ e been solved or at least aided
by the LiSf^^ of one or T^ore o* the oreviously discusseo aids.
*^jhat the "iiecision m^kor now neeis are effective ciecision
strateQies that imoose riqor and orovide a loqical*
structural fra'^ework to assist them in tne orocess of
choosina an ootimal decision alternative in the face of
voluminous and often inconclusive evidence.
Operations an.,i In^olHaence (OPPiT) is a decision tool
that orovi^es Just such a framework for ^deliberation,
reasonina, and analysis (Arrey et al.» I'-^T^, d. 3). OPINT
is an on-line* interactive* real-time model which aids
decision makers bv orescribing a straiqhtforwarc normative
orocedure for oroanirim and analyzing difficult decision
problems. These problems may involve both uri certainty about
the outcome of future events and perplexity about the
complex value trade-offs involved in the choice of a course
of action.
0^1 '^iT is a decision-analytic baseo* computer assisted
decision aid. Its orin^ary objective is to provide decision
makers a orocedural framewor<f or decision template* that
insures thpir ultimate decision choice is a coherent one. A
aa

coherent cnoic*:^ is one which is consistent with their own
value structures an^i beliefs ^hout the relative livelihoods
o'^ future evonrs th^t will imoact the decision outcon^e (Arrey
et al . , 1 ^7Q, n. 3) .
The funriaTiental oroduct of OPirjT is a coniouter-stored
conceotual reoresentation, or decision models of the
decision orohle'^i at hand, whereas decision analysis
orovides the theoretical dac^qround and procedural guidance/
the QPI'iT decision model provides the soecific
•nethodoloaical tool for orocessina information and
evalua*:ino the various decision alternatives ooen to the
decision maimer. An in-derth exclanation of how OPINT aids
in the decision process is discussed in Charter Four,
Evaluation (t:V"L)» another on-line/ interactive/
real-time Tociel/ incorporates another decision strategy
which nrovides the derision maker with a normative procedure
for analyzing difficult decision problems. It is especially
desianed to evaluate and comnare possible options usinq a
multi-attribute utili«-y analysis technioue. EVA I. is best
applied to procurement (decisions wherein systems are
compared/ but is aporopriate for a diverse set of decision
analytic problems (Decisions and DesianS/ Inc,/ 1*^77/ pp,
1-5),
The use of EV^L is broken into two phases. First/ the
decision maker creates the structures o^ a hierarchical
multi-attribute evaluation model using the tVAL Structure




In Qfier to utilize t^^e EVAL Structure orooram, the
oronleni Tiust be neco'^onse^ into a hierarchical structure
which reflects th^ Iotic-^I interrelationship of all the
factors involved. This structure is then entered and the
model is create cK Now unaer the direction of the EVAL
nroara'T'f the criterion used for evaluatino the alternatives
are entered. Once entered/ their rpsoectiv** weiuhts of
i-noortance are entered. Mext/ the relative score which eacfy
alternative achieved for each criteria is entered. For
examole/ consider thre= radio sets which are being evaluated
for selection before nrocurement (Al, A2/ and A3), The
criterion of evaluation art^ cost/ ranae/ oortabilitv/ and
reliability. Each of these criteria are weighted 30%/ 2 0'/,
,
10%/ ann ^0% resoectivelv. ^^ext/ the three radio sets are
evaluated accoraina fo each criteria using an aroitrary
utility scale. Cost would show scores of 5 for set A], aO
for set A2, and <^0 for set A3. This means A3 is considered
to have the best cost. This process is repeated for each
criteria. It is also normal for the criteria to have
sub-criteria which would also reauire the same procedure.
Mext/ EVAL gives the evaluation scores for each of the
alternative systems resulting from the aggregations
orescritjed in the model structure. ''^low the decision maker
can examine the effect of the criterion weights throuah a
sensitivity analysis. This will quickly show him which
criteria are the critical ones and take action to insure the
Ub

data surrounTinc! rh^t criteria is as accurate as oossible.
EV^L ^oes not io anvti-iino tne decision maimer nimself could
not hev'* jonp hiTsel'^. Nhat it does do t ^o^eve f , is allow
him not o be oressed bv time or to worrv about
ccPDutational procedures. He can olay tne "what if" qame
and feel confident about the decision he must make.
Another decision aid has been neveloDed to assist
B arouDS in necidinq how to deal with imoortant issues or
' oroblems. Its nuroose is the imorovement of decision makinq
i by continuous oarticicant interaction with the comouter
durina tne aecision makinq process CLeal et al.r 1978, d.
l-l). '^embers o^ the a roue ar<s allowed to input their
respective estimates of the occurrence of specific events
and their valu-^s (weiqhts) of the importance ot specific
decision outcomes. The decision aid then compares the input
and informs tne arouo members of any disaqreements between
them. but most imoortantly/ it focuses the discussion only
on the disaqreements w^ich are important to the stated qoa1.
[ne differences which are not imoortant are shown to be just
that. Finally/ it suoqests to the qroup precisely how their
disaqreements miaht be resolved. This enables qrouPS to
move much more quickly toward decisions. As a by-productf
profiles are developed of the participants which snow who
has expertise in soecial areas as well as who is a
risk-avoider or risk-taker (Leal et al., 1978/ po, 1-5 to






















FIGURE 15: THE GROUP DECISION AID PROCESS
(Andriole, 1979, P. 17)
The decision qrouo is corroosei of the oarticioants (de-
cision Ta^ersK an i n t e rred i a ^ o r / ann a director.
The interTediator's nriTi^r^rv function is to facil-
itate co-^-^unication betv«/een the arouo and the comouter.
This is done bv translatinn sncken reouests into comout-
er inputs. These inouts could be lists of events, alterna-
tive actions, requests for disolays, or modifications
to any orevious inputs. The director helos with the outout
by oresentina and exolainina it to the pa r t i c i oan t s
.
The director also focuses the group's activities and insures
the incuts are appropriate. As a result, virtually no
oarticicant trainino is needea to operate the systern, and a
as

arcup can beain wori<- en it-s decision Droblem almost
i.-n.-Tieoiatcly after it is convened.
-nether con-Dutef'izPT aid/ the tarly .Naming ana
Monitorina SvsteT- (F/'ANiS)/ has heen O'^veloDeri to aid the
Indications ano v^iarnina (li/l) corm unity. E»'iA^"S orovides
then^ with an interactive coiiputer based system of oolitical/
military, ana domestic indicators for daily rrnnitorinq of
international ma intra national affairs (Daly, 1^578, o,
^). The System nas the cacability to store auantitative
international oolitical dat3 from t'^ho for most countries of
the world ana can therefore oe used to do retrospect ive
analysis as <vell as current, daily IJ^/'. The data is
aaqreqated ny month, aua^ter, and year. EwAMS has the
capability to track sinale countries, combinations of
country-oairs, reqions or the entire world twith these
quantitative indicators, or specific reoions may be
specified (Oaly, 1*^7 8, o. b). At- present, there is some
doubt as to whetner £ v*i A '-^3 will ever be fielded because its
ooeration is extremely slo^'. But the concept is a qood one
and further research may prove beneficial.
The E/jAMS is COT, prised of the following components
(Andriole, 19B0, pp. ?M-3a):
1. General Scans - A aeneral scan is an aqqreqation
of countries by some criteria, e.g., a scan
rjefined by .-jeoaraohic region would aqgreaate
countries by arouos such as Latin America or
Middle Eastern. A general scan allows an
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analyst- fo look at several countries taken
"OQether rat^^er tf^an Inokina separately at T^any
country-nairs. If the imi cations for the yrouc
as a whole suaaest unusually hioh activity/
tension, or uncertainty, the analyst can droo to
the country-ny-ccuntry level or even track the
recent activity of a sinale country to determine
tne source of the rtisturoance or the reqional
level. General scans thus ma^e the system much
more efficient and less time consuminn for the
analyst.
2 m Quantitativef Political, '"'ilitary, hconomic, and
Domestic Indicators - Quantitative indicators
for crisis warning include foreion, domestic,
and international colitical, military, and
economic factors. "''He indicators are both
dynamic ( e v en t s -b a seo ) and static (attribute
based ) .
3 . ^' u 1 t i ''' ethod Forecastina Capability - The
unified multi-method forecastinq capability
requires the system to oenerate different kinds
of forecasts or warninqs via different methods
for different events and conditions.. Such
options have been designed with reference to
Objects, ooals, and methods of forecasting.
Experimentation is still beino oerformeo in this
50

A':/'Jition^1 research is currently heinq perforTierJ to
ciesian an ^id ^hicb will *ocus on Soviet crisis behavior
since vorld .'sar II. This aid will include the following
tasks :
1. DevelooTient of an inventory of Soviet crisis
manaqe^ent b-^havior, l"^'4c>-1979,
2. Collection o* oata on the characteristics of
these crises to show the nature of Soviet
military crises.
3. A Tore intensive analysis and codinq of key
Soviet crises to identify the crisis
environTonts that mav affect the occurrence of
crisis manaaeTent oroblef^s encountered by the
Soviet Union/ and variables describing crisis
objectives/ actions/ and results for the Soviet
Union.
y. Statistical analys'='s of the characteristics of
Soviet crisis manaqement ooerations/ the
environrrent in which thev have taken olace/ and
the crisis man^^oeTien t oroolenns encountered by
the Soviet Union.
5. Comoarison of these statistical analyses with




All o^ tf^ese 'lecision aids Hr3ve been ciavertised as
beino vaHiahle to •"iprision Tiakina. None h^ve been
exDerifTient^Hv ev=)1ueted with kncwledaeable subjects in a
decision T^ax-ing environment. A baseline of such evaluations
is imoortant to establish in order to orovide a Ljseful tool
and better yet/ to orovide for much needeo technology
transfer and real »/orldf real ti-ne feedoack on the value
(utility) of tne tec^^nolo'^y.
QPI'lT xas selectp^ as an accrooriate candidate for
e xoe r i rnen t B t i on for a number of reasons. (-irst^ it is
readily availaole as a oackaae at tne ^'ava1 Postaraduate
School. Second/ all of the eauipment required for its
oceration already exists at the School. Finally/ due to




I V . FU^'CTIO^^L OFSCf^IPTIO'i OF OPI'-]T
DPI NT is a oecision-analytic based/ comnuter-assisted
decision strateav (^mey et a] . , l'^' 7^ , d. y). It was
desianed and built hv Hecisinns and Oesions Inc./ of '^'cLean/
Viroinia/ under contract to the Oefense Advanced Research
Projects Aoencv (Di^'PA). It i^as 'written in the APL
orooraTiTiina lanouaoe for the IC''^ SI coTouter, In
addition, 0°P'jr has recently Oeen rewritten in FORTRA'"'vl aP
for- use on POP 11 series corrcuters.
The general nuroose of OPI'JT is to aid decision makers
bv providing them a caoability to construct/ store/
retrieve/ exercise/ and refine decision-analytic models of
comnlex decision problems tnev face. The OPINT decision
model/ which is interactive/ real-time/ and on-line/ is an
ornanizinq frampwork for information orocessing. Decision
analysis is a methodoloaical tool with which the decision
maker defines and exercises the OPPiT model to evaluate
decision alternatives certain ina to the problem (Amey et
a1./ 1^70, OP. 5-?l).
The OPI'JT system is designed to be used interactively by
decision makers who are relatively unsophisticated with
resoect to computer i-echnologv. Accordingly/ the design
satisfies two human-factors objectives: OPPiT is a menu-
driven system an'i is desianed to be foroivina of pro-
cedural errors by the us^r.
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E^ci^ rtecision mociel created bv the user nav be aiven a
ijnioue label* althouqn each is constructed usino the same
aeneric for"nat. The r'Odel forrrat is shown qrachicallv in
F i q u r e lb.
The forn^at consists of the foMowinq ele^^ents
which, when comDletely SDecified, uniquely deHne an QPINT
decision model:
1. The decision - A short label defining the
decision pr oblen. This label is also aoolied to
the decision model and is used to store and
retrieve the iiodel.
d. Decision ^l^-prnatives - A list of decision
alternatives available to the decision maker.
Eacn alternative is aoorooriatelv labeled.
3. An iJncertain Future Event - A key uncertain
event/ Ef that will influence the eventual
outco'^e of the decision. The uncertain event
is attached to each of the decision alternatives.
y. Event Outcomes - A list of the discrete event
outcomes/ each aocroo r i a«" e 1 y labeled/ that
together define the universe of oossibilities
reoardino the occurrence of the future event.
5. Event Probabilities - A vector of orobahilities
that are associated witn the event outcomes/
which reoresent the orobability that an event
will occur. A D'robability is a measure of

































inclusive* that reorespnts the extent to which
an iniivi'lual believes a future event will occur
However, in this soecification, oroD abilities
are exore!^se'i as a oercentaoe of certainty*
e . q . » as a % vice , '4
,
Decision Outcomes - The elements discLJSsed thus
far Hofinp oossible decision outcomes. Each
decision outcome is a oairod combination of one
decision alternative with one event outcome.
The remaining three elements of the model forrrat are
used to soecifv tho re'\3f}\je conseouences associated with
the decision OL'tcomes. The consenuence of an outcome is
exoressed in t'^rms of the relative regret that would be
exoerienced bv t*^e decision maker should the outcome
actually occur. These three elements are:
1. Decision ("utccme Criteria - '^ list of criteria/
each aooronria''ely labelea* by whicn the
decision rnaker would judge the relative regret
associated with the decision outcome.
2
.
Criteria /•j eights - A vector of weights
associated with the criteria, which represent
the relative contribution of the criterion.
Criteria weignts are expressed numericaHy as a
oercentaoe of the whole/ e.a,/ as 6 0%.
3. Reoret - r?egret is a measure of the conseauence
of a decision outcome. The total regret
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assicinea to a decision outcof^^e is a weighted
linear corrihin^jtion of the individual cr"iteria
rearets. For eaci^ criterion am for eacn
ciecision outcorre/ the user must soecify a value
of rearet. A renret is a number between and
-1/ inclusive^ that represents the relative
dearee of dissatisfaction that the decision
Tai<er associates with a particular decision
Oi.Jtcom'a. Zero represents no rearet/ -1
represents maxiTum regret. How ever/ in this
specification reorets are always expressed as a
percentaae of the maximum; e.g./ as -3 vice
-0.3. t^efer to Fiaure 17.
This completes the model format. The decision model is
completely and uniquely specified i«hen the elem, ents
described above are definea by the user. The input
specifications oescribinq the model can be processed to
oro^uce the followinq results!
1. Corr^binea Value Regret ^'^atrix - £• sinqle matrix
that displays the total or comhineo rearet
associated with each of the decision outcomes.
For each outcome/ the combined regret is
obtained by weiqhtina and aading the component
reorets contributed by each criteria. A combined
value rearet matrix is snown in Fioure 18.
2
.
Expected Value ^-'atrix - A sinqle matrix that
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FIGURE 17: REGRET MATRICES




E^ (U\BEL) E2 (LABEL) E3 (LABEL)
Dj (LABEL) -17 -31
D2 (LABEL) -9 -9 -17
D3 (LABEL) -2^ -22 -22
Di| (LABEL) -30 -26 -25
FIGURE 18: A COMBINED VALUE REGRET MATRIX




Hisolavs the weigHted exoecteH rearet^
associated 'wi^h each decision outcome. The
exoectei value matrix takes into account the
relative likelihoocjs of the event outcomes.
Expected Value Vector - A vector that aisolays
the weiohted exnecte-l rearet/ associated with
each o^ the decision alternatives.
The exoecteo value matrix and the excecteo value
vector (total) are disolayed toaether, as shown in Fiqure
There are two sensitivity analyses that are useful to
the user. Both are based on the exoecteo value vector and
are described as follows:
1. Threshold 'Matrix - A iiatrix that di Sclavs the
eleven exoected value vectors Generated by
either one of the following operations^ at
t^^e user's ortion:
a. Varying the crcbability o'^ a nesignateg
event outcome^ from to 100%/ in steos of
10, The other event outcomes* maintain
their oroportional relationships with each
other.
b. Varyino the weiaht of a designated criterion
from to lOnv, , in steos of 10. The weights
of the other criteria maintain their




E^ (LABEL) E2 (U^.BEL) E3 (U\BEL) TOTAL
-i|
-4










FIGURE 19: AN EXPECTED VALUE MATRIX AND
AN EXPECTED VALUE VECTOR (Amey
et al . , 1979 , P. 12)
61

the saT^e nanner as do the oroo abilities
'lescrif)<=ri in fhp nrecedina p.iraarapi^.
In roth o'f t!^o above cases, the least reoret disDlaved
in the excecteo value nayoff vector is identified by
an asterisk. 'Jomallv, the decision alternative that leads
to the decision outco'Tie having the least rearet *«ill change
as the designateo event orooabiHty or criterion weight
is increfrented from to 10 0%. The coints of change
are referred to as threshold c">oints and ^re noted on the nna-
trix. Fiaijre -^O shows an examole threshold rratrix.
EXPECTED VALUE WHEN
PROBABILITY OF E^ (LABEL) IS:
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Dj (LABEL) -57 -52 -45 -40 -34 -29
-23*-17*-ll* -5*
D2 (LABEL) -51 -47 -42 -38 -34 -30 -23*-21 -17 -13 -9
D3 (LABEL) -27 -27 -27*-26*-26*-25*-25 -25 -24 -24 -24
Di| (LABEL) -26*-25*-27*-27 -27 -28 -28 -28 -29 -29 -30








ally c*^-inae event Drohaoilities - The user
mgv Tenprate a test e^oecteo value vector t •^ a t
is hasorj on an ari-i*-rarilv assioned vector of
event c rohab i H t i es . The user fray soecify
several iifferent crobability vectors and note
t^e resultant exoectea value vectors. An
exaTole of the disolav is shown in Figure 21.
KOREAN INTENT
NO ACTION HARASS SHOOT DOWN
CURRENT LIKELIHOOD: 60 30 10
ENTER REVISED VALUES: 30 60 10
NEW VALUES: 30 60 10
IF THESE VALUES ARE CORRECT TYPE GO: (GO)
EXPECTED VALUE/REGRET
DO NOT FLY -38
MODIFIED ROUTE -26
ARMED ESCORT -10
HIGH PERFORMANCE A/C -10
NORMAL MISSION -29
FIGURE 21: MANUALLY CHANGED EVENT PROBABILITIES
(Amey et al., 1979, P. 16)
OPINT is a'='siqned to oerform the basic functions
descrioed below:
1. Maintain a library of OPINT -r^odels - Store




Loa'-l 9n existinq nPI^jf model - Disolay the
1
-ah els o^ these mo
n
els store (i in the Tiodel
lior^rv, and oerniit: the user to retf^ieve any
'^esirei -noiel. The loa-ied Tiodel is referred to
as the current model.
Disolav the results of the current model -
Permit the user to examine the structure and
Cont*^nt of the current model by disolayirq:
a. event o robab i 1 i t i es
^
b. criteria weiohts/
c . reore t s f
d. combined value matrix*
e. exoected value matrix, and
f. expected value vector.
Wevise the current model - Permit the user to
make chames to the structure ana content of the
current model. The user may revise:
a. event orobabilitieSf
b. criteria and criteria weights*
c. decision alternatives*
d . r eore t s * and
e. combiner) value regret matrix.
Save the current model - Permit the user to add
the current model to the model library.
Perform sensitivity analyses - Permit the user
to test the sensitivity of the current moaei by




7. Create c^ new OPPiT tiqcipI - PprTiit the user to
create a new '^oriel, which then becofrips the
current mocjel. Tne user creates a model by
sceci^vinf3 the elements requiren for the model
as explained earlier. The user may also use a




V. THF ^F3IG^J OF THE EXPFPIMFijT
The conduct o'^ exoeriTipnts u'^ina cof^n^and and control
decision aids» such as GPIMT, present srecial nroblems (Cain
and Poh, 1*^78/ o. ft). Historically/ the evaluation of
comTand and control svstef^s has heen focused on hardware
TeasureTipnts, I. ittlp attention was naid to software/
esoecially decision aids, ^s a result/ few well defined
Quantitative TeasureTients ^xist for measurina the quality of
C5 decision aids (Sinaiko/ X'^ll , oo. 5-6), Secono/ there
are no "correct" answers to a decision oroblem (Daniels/
1*^77, o, Ih). Rgfher, an aid such as OPIfiT is a coqnitive
tool to assist thp decision maker in revealina and
forTiuMzina the ele'^pnts of the decision proble'^ as the
decision ng<er oerc^ives them. Lastly/ during the
develocment of these decision aidS/ there Has been
relatively little syneraism between developers and r>otentia1
users (Cain and Poh/ 1978/ o, 6), Users are often not
familiar with the new technology and are unsure exactly what
to exoect in the way of performance. Developers are unsure
exactly what the notential users want. This occurs because
thev aren't sure who the users will be and causes a very
general aiq to be developed - on** which will try to suit
everyone's n^^e-is.
Any exceriment v>;hich involves the use of decision aids
must be desinnf>d carefully. The experiment should be
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desianea in orrier to assess both the capability of the
technoloqv and i t <; overall utility as it relates to total
systPT oerfoT'^ance (;^anielSf 197 7, d, 1'4). There are four
levels o"^ exceriTents varyina in foPTaliST from very loose
"free olay" with only subjective judq-nent outout to "highly
structured" with cofriolete soocification of conduct of trials
and o'J^'out consistinc: of carefully measureo systeii
attributes i*^ arr et al.f 1^7^/ o. id) . These levels froTi
least structure'^ to rpost structured are '.
1. Validation exoeriT^ents. These exoerifents woula
consist of the deouaoing of hardware or
software. The feasibility of the systen to work
accordina to fixed soecifications is determined.
An examcle would oe the debuoaing of the OPINT
software orior to placing it on line for
operational testing or use,
2. Demonstration experiments. These experiments
would be somewhat more structured than the
valiootion experiment/ in that a scenario would
be followed. The terii demonstration refers to
the tyoe of output from the experiment. The
outout would be mostl-y personal impressions in
the minds of the users of the system under
demonstration.
3. Assessment experiments. These are experiments
where triads are conducted over a wide range of
o7

conlitions with little control over sources of
error. The ao^l is to obtain an idea of how
'«ell the systerr cerforms. The output is
S'.jbjective opinions of the exoerirrenters and
subjects. Thpir ooinions of how worthwhile the
svsteTi is and any ootential uses are recorded as
exne r i -nen t a 1 data.
y. Fvaluation exoeri-nents. These are the most
rioorous tyoe of experiments, Exoerinnental
conditions rjre carefully controlled. ^^ number
of replications are oerformeo followeci by a
formal analysis of numeric measurement data.
The assessment -experiment was chosen as the means for
determining the utility of OPINT. No prior experiments
concernina the utility of OPI'MT have been performed and
therefore no baseline currently exists. The results of this
experiment should fill that aao. Subjective impressions and
judgments of C^ users a r <=> what is needer:) to help (Jetermine
the usefulness of OPRiT and that is what this assessment
will do
.
The major objective of this experiment was to assess
the utility of OPIMT as a computerized aecision aid in C3
applications. Secondary objectives which helped in this
ooal included tne followina:
I. To assess tne extent to which OPI^!T facilitates
thoro'joh an.j timely decision makina.
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2. To invesi-iqate the user-QPI'jr interface and to
suaaest re'^edi-al




To survey user ooinion on ti^e operation tjnd
Dotential usef<j1ness of QPpJT in C3 decisions.
The priTiarv objective of OPI\'T is to assist decision
makers in the struct urino and analysis of decision nror^lems
(Amey et al.r \'^1^ , c. lA) . One could imply from tnis that
a better decision or croiuct is delivered t^^rouah the use of
OPI'IT. The question vhich is now immediate iS/ "What is
better?" Hetter can not be scenario dependent or olayer
deoendent. It must be qeneral in nature. OPIMT's
oerformance may be be measured in terms of time (the time
from oercention of oroblem to decision). A faster decision
is often times needed and therefore the capability to do so
may be termed " ao od to have", But it is only "good to have"
if the Quality of the decision remains at least as qood as
without the aid. In order to assess this feature^ a method
for measuring the quality of the decision is needed. As
stated earlier, the "correctness" of a decision is extremely
difficult to measure if at all. In this exoeriment no
attemot was made to define or measure this attribute.
'A' hat remained was the subjective judqment of the
subjects involved in tne experiment. The siibjects were
students from the C3 curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School. C5 students vere used since the assessment was
6^

perforTe'i of iDPIf^iT's ahiHtv to help with C3 tyoe DroDlems.
These stuaents wero aH oDerational officers with a larqe
arrount of excerience in onePrStional prohlens in the field.
They reoresenten the 'irmvf Air Forces Navv^ an,:l ^^arines.
They were in their last (sixth) Quarter of studies and had
been exoosed to nurrerous aecision models and aids. The
subjects were arouoed into oairs to fornn a decision team.
All the suoiects had been trained in the theory and
oceration of 0*^T>)T ana had received at least three hours of
instruction incluoina one hour of hands-on time.
Ti«o tyoes of decision situations were used - time
critical ana time not critical. It was understood that the
ranne of ti^^e oossibilities is infinite and there was no way
to assess each. Thereforer the two extre^nes th.at could be
encountered were usen.
Two scenarios were followed which reouired the subjects*
actinq as decision maimers/ to recommend a soecific course
of action. The two scenarios reoresented varying comolexi-
ties which *ace a C3 decision maker. They were carefully
designed to avoid the alleqafion that they were either OPINT
or subject dependent. The first scenario^ a Cuoan
blockade oroblem, was rather complex. It required an
in-deoth assessment of intelligence estimates in order to
predict the occurrence of an uncertain event. In ad-
dition, the evaluation of numerous courses of action was
requireci. The second scenario was an air reconnaissance
oroblem. This one was somewhat easier as the kev uncer-
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tain event hai ^Ire^dy been assesses and the decision maker
was only required to evaluate the courses o^ action which
were availaole. •-• cooy o^ each scenario is included in Ad-
D e n d i X ^ .
The subjects clayed one scenario using OPR'T and then
olayed the second in a manual mode without the use of OPINT,
The schedLjle was varied so some subjects plaveci the dif-
ficult Cuban croblem first and son-e the easier reconnais-
sance oroblem. In addition, the use of 'IPPJT was variea
so it was useti alternately first or second. Fiaure 22 oor-
trays a tvcical schedule. '^lotice the aaded dimension of
the time critical and time not critical factors.
It was recognized the evaluation measures used in the
exreriment would not be Quantitatively measurable.
Therefore care was tai^en to carefully select both measures
of effectiveness ("'•^OF) and measures of nerformance C^OP)
which suDoorted the aoals of the exo^riment.
A measure of effectiveness is defined as those
evaluation -measures which indicate the contribution of QPINT
to the overall decision orocess fACCAT Qoerational
Evaluation Task, 1^7 8, d. b). •'^ieasures of oerformance are
defined as those evaluation measures which indicate a level
of technical oerformance relative to the internal
functioninc of OPIMT itself. 3oth are aoclicable to
decision aia experiments. The '-OE ' s and ''OP ' s were desianed
so as to:































FIGURE 22 EXPERIMENT SCHEDULE
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aecision Process^ not ^he decision outcome.
2. Be objective so '^ev Jo not introouce nias.
3. Pe si-nple/ to ac'iieve econo^^y ana ease of use.
4. Permit detopTiination of which functions within
the decision orocess are aided and under what
condi t i ons
.
5. Yield results in the exreri-nent whicn are
extend iole to real world ooerational
envi ronmentS.
6. Be operationally olausible and intuitively
unaerstandahle bv ootential users (ACCAT
Ooerational Evaluation TasK, 1978, no. 6-^).
The followinq is a list of the V'OF's which were chosen
for use in the e x oe r i Tipn t J
1. Time elaosed in arrivina at the decision. This
includes the time from oerceotion of a oroblem
until a decision is reached. In addition/ the






"5. Objectivity in determining relationshios among
factors contributing to the selection of an
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alternative course of action.
^. Fisk oerceivea to ne associate c:i with the
decision.
5. Ease of use of the decision aid.
b. Fase of modification of data within the nnodel,
7, Perceived advantaoes/disadvanta:ies qained from
the use of th*= aecision aio.
8. Ease of recovery from user errors.
Data «as qatherea on each of the above^ throuah the use
of Questionnaires. The exceotion was the first '^OE. For
this oner timps w»='re recorded while the sut^jects were using
OPI^lT to caoture the amount of time required to build the
model/ time to evaluate the data/ and total time to
decision. These tines were then compare ci with times to
evaluate data and total time for the manual operation.
Three questionnairf^s were used to record the ooinions of the
subjects. A questionnaire was comoleted after the olav of
each scenario and one comoletec^ after both. Samole
Questionnaires are included as Appendix C.
Ourino the actual olav of the scenarios^ a
consideration was how to satisfactorily place the subjects
into the mental ro1<=> required. This included the ability of
the subjects to adeouately assess orobabilities of future
events and the rearets reauired in the construction of the
7a

model. This researc'i design subsumed this consideration by
locatincj orobabi1i'"y estimates within the scenarios and
oefinino t^o ooals and objectives to be reached. Subjects
were encouraqed to nrovide their own regret assessments if
they had exoerience in si^^ilar orot)lems. If the subjects
had no previous exoeriencer an individual was available to
act as a senior official. The senior official's role was to
orovide reoret dat-a» if needed^ and to answer questions
concernir:! uncertainties or am biauities.
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V I . THE RESULTS (IF THF EXPhRI^hMT
Tnree siqnifiC'^nt results from the exoeriment were
revealed. First/ nearlv all (85 "-i) subjects stated they
liked the caoabilities which OPI'>]T Qa\Je them anrj would use
OPI^'T in the future if it was available to them. Seconds
althouah tney liked the caoabilities o^ OPINT, all (100%)
stated they did riot like it in its oresent form^
particularly in the area of user-interface. Finally/ a
Droarammina bua (erf'or) was discovered in the use of the
sensitivitv analysis. The sensitivity analysis permitted
the comoarison of only three courses of action/ show i no the
expected regrets for the others as zeros.
It is imoortant to Keec each of these results in mind
as the specific results are read . Wany negative comments
were conditioned oy the statement that if user-interface was
better/ or if the sensitivity worked correctly/ the comments
would be cosit-ive. The cases where this occurs are
appropriately noted.
The sensitivity analysis prooramminq "buq" was found
during the play of the Air Reconnaissance Scenario. This
scenario had five possible courses of action which needed
evaluation. OPI^T handled the expected value and comoined
value calculations perfectly. But whenever a sensitivity
analysis was asked for , OPI^iT would not compute the expected
rearet for all courses of action. Additional research
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reveale':^ that in the case of a sensitivity analysis where
the orohaniHty of the event was varie'-l/ OPIuT would only
comoute threp courses of action, '.'ihen the variation of the
criterion vveiqhts «as as<e'-i for, DPI NT would corroute four
courses of action. Any reTiaiTiino courses of action received
rearet values of zero. This did not oerrfit a comolete
evaluation of alternatives and had an adverse effect on the
feelinqs of thp subjects toward the decision aid. Although
OPINT had only o<»en installed on the POP 11/70 for one rnonth
prior to the exoerirrent, orocjramminq bugs such as these
should have been d'^t'^cted and corrected orior to presenting
the aid as operationally ready.
All but four subjects said they felt the scenarios were
realistic. These four felt that priorities established in
the scenario were not what they ^elt they shoula be and that
orior decisions Tade did not see^* realistic from their
viewpoint. Fhp use of the realistic scenarios coupled with
the ability of the suDJects to inout their own probabilities
and regrets facilitated a decision making environment that
was as realistic as possible.
The eight "^^OF's stated in Chapter Five were evaluated
through the use of questionnaires. A summary of the results
for each is snown below:
1. Time elapsed in arriving at the decision. Times
i^epe recorded in order to capture the time
subjects were spending on the scenarios, both
with and without the utilization of OPI.'^JT.
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Those tiiT>es were recorded not to rjetermine if a
fast'^r aecision was oeino maae , hut to provide
an indication of ho^ lonq it took to build the
OPI^jr no del anri evaluate it. In all caseSf more
ti^e was soent while using OPINT than in the
manual state. The time reouired to build the
CjPTMT Todel averaged ^5 minutes for the Cuban
scenario and 2^ minutes for the Air
Peconnaissance scenario. Tne times were tightly
arouoed as is shown bv standard oeviations of '^
and ^ minutes resoectivelv. The time to
evaluate THE 0^1 NT model averaged ?A minutes and
M minutes. Aaain si^all stancjard deviations of
3 and 1 minute show tiqntly arouoed data. These
times are verv near to what was exoected and
Show a aeneral ability of the subjects to build
and manipulate the model.
^. Identification/elimination of non-essential
information. The goal here was to Determine if
the decision process was aided by identifying
non-essential information. 6^% of the users of
OPITjT were able to identify some non-essential
information while only 5l/i were able to in the
manual mode. The items of information
identified variecj according to subject-specified
probabilities and regrets. An adaitional ^4% of
the OPI\'T users stated problems with the
78

sensifivitv analysis creventen them frofn
oossiolv i:-ien«"ifyinQ any non-essential
information.
5. Objectivity in rieterminina relations^ios among
factors contrihutino to the selection of a
course of action. The aoal of this MQE was to
deternine if the subjects were aided in the
decision orocess ny aeterni nation of which
factors were the ^ost critical. b'i% felt UPINT
definitely aided in the decision orocess. These
subjects definitely liked the way OPI^^T oromoted
detailed and non-subjective analysis of what was
aoina to haonen and whv. The rest found it
confusinq due to uncertainty of what the
aisolays were actually tellinq fhem. 63% also
stated they were able to assess the criticality
of the con<-ributino factors when using OPIfiT.
The evaluator's observation here was that in the
manual mod^f one factor was determined to be
critical and then the rest iqnored. This did
not occur when OPirjT was used.
U, RisK oerceivert to he associated with the
decision. This '^OE was used to measure the
.jeoree of uncertainty or certainty in the final
decision. 8 5 7- of the subjects in the manual
mode said they made the best decision oossible
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wHile onlv 56°'. in the OPINT mode f^lt that
certain. Two tyo?s o^ comments were macje.
Firs'"/ the sensitivity oroblem was again
me^tioneo as a hindrance. Secona* several
subjects felt uneasy about what the numbers in
the disclays actually meant. For example/ in
th<^ exoected valuer combined value/ and
sensitivity disolaysr only numbers are shown.
There is no explanation of what hey mean or
which numbers are best.
Ease of use of the decision aid. This ^'*C\t was
used to heln determine what tyoe of user-OPIMT
interface existed, (Jnly 31% stated that (J PINT
nresenteo disolays in a manner which was easily
understood. Sensitivity and combined value
disolays received the most comments as being the
most difficult to understand. Also/ there were
several comments concerning the inputs reauired.
f-^any were not sure what was actually being asked
for and when to hit the carriage return and when
not to. Almost all ^5% stated the disolays were
qenerated guicicly enough. No problems were
observed here/ even riuring times of Peak usage.
Additional comments concerned the use of menus.




6, Ease of modification of data within the model.
The no-^1 here vias to determine how easv it was
to correc*" he many errors that untrained
tyoists will m^ike. QS^i stated it was easy to
maice corrections in the model. The only
neoative comments concerned the use of the menus
for this ournose. There existed too much
retracino throuoh menu selections to make
corrections in the same area or level of the
mode 1 .
7. Ease of recovery froni user errors. Tnis '^OE
measured how well the CJPIi'^jT oroaram recovered
from incut errors. Here the goal was to
netermine if normal tynina or careless errors
caused major orohlems. ^PX of the subjects who
made errors felt recovery from these errors was
Door. Comments centered around some simple
mistatfos whicfi caused major orotilems. During
initial lisolaySf a selection of a choice is
made by movina the cursor to the desired choice
and then hittinc the 'X' key for execution,
however in six cases^ subjects pressed the 'X'
key followed by a carriaae return. This caused
the orooram to halt and the subjects were
reauired to begin again. Several subjects felt
that nebulous innut directions caused several
errors which coula not be changed until after
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the entire moiiel was coToleted.
Perceived advantenes/disadvaotaaes aained froTi
the use c'^ OPI'^-jT, The evclicit consideration of
all factors through the ororrotion of a aood
thought Drocess was the comment most often
stated. Several stated they liked beina forced
into a logical thought orocess. Alsor the
subjects felt that OPIfv'T orovided them with
gocu mentation of their c^ecision and woulcj make
it easier to oresent the outcome ana justify the
conclusion. The disadvantaces listeo for using
DPl^T as it currently exists centered around the
u se r - i n t e r f ac e oroblem. There exist'=»g a general
lack of comfort due to the limited aescriotions
and assistance from the aia.
An adgitional Question concerning training was
asked of each subj**ct. They were asked to
comment on the amount of trainino they felt was
reguired for OPIMT usage. The overwhelming
resDonse was about two hours of structured
instruction on the theory and use of the aidr
followea by one to two hours of hands-on
demonstrations. This amount of instruction was




V [ I . Cn-;CLiiSinr:S /\^ID PEC^MM^^M) A T T UTiS
It was oeterTined that OP INT is beneficial to the
decision rnai<er in thp 'jecision makino orocess. The majority
of the subjects comments were either positive in relation to
(3°I'iT or »ou] ri havo been with either no proqram errors or
bp'tter use'^-in'-erfpce. OPI^:T's greatest advantaae lies in
two areas. First, if ororrotes (and cossihly even forces)
the user into a souno thouaht orocess. In the heat of
crisis or even just day-to-dav decisions/ it is often too
easy to forget the orincioles of Tood decision making and
sHc to scmetnina less. The use of OFIi^iT could help to keeo
tnat frof^ hanoenina. Second, OI-^IijT provides its own
doc <-J "mentation. This documentation is then available to
ore sent decisions and show ^hy a Particular (decision was
made. It is also easv to focus on the critical areas and
not waste time on the non-important ones.
There are still some major flaws which need to be
worked out of the system. The first and foremost is the
sensitivity analysis. Program. buos such as these can not
exist in an aid if it is to be used properly. Second, is
the user-interface problem. The aid must be designed for
the casual user, one who at one time may have been
proficient, out throuoh lack of use has forgotten the key
reauirements. Additional comments concerning wnat is needed
or what is beina displayed are a must.
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Tho movement o -^ the user fhrouah the aia via the menus
also nee^s attention. Users shoula be niven the choice of
returnina to several levels rather than only uo one or r:lown
one
.
Top fine! anO by no means the least imoortant is the
oroblem ot crooram halts. Clothing arieves a user more than
havina to start over/ esneci^Hv after a qreat deal of work
has alrearty ooen Hone. The svstem currently disolays
numeric incurs for verific=^tion. fnere is no reason why
a'ohaoetic or menu choices could not also be done.
This author has S'=»veral recommendations for both
imorovino the decision aid anri for future experiments with
it. '^s stated earlier, the aid needs to be designed for the
octional user. This user's knowledce of the aid could ranqe
from comolete to nothinn deoendinq on amount of usaqe. The
aid should De desioned *or the two extremes and even for the
user in the mi'5dl'='. It ne^^ds to be both user friendly" and
"error tolerant". One technique could be optional
verbosity. For each disolav/ three sets of comments could
be oreoare'J, The decision maker then selects which set is
desired deoenoinq on need. The knowledgeable LiSer would
receive only short phrases which could be keyed on to
generate in ruts or disolav results. The same tvoe of
caoabilitv wou'd exist ^or the other tyoes of users. This
way the user receives only what is needed. Another
variation of this is to allow each user to specify exactly




Tho adiition of so-^e soi^t of "HELP" corn-, and would also
he useful. If a lecision va'^er nets stuci< and needs soi^e
orofTDtina or internreta''ion/ a sinncle recuest woula fill
that need. User confidence could imorove areatly with this
siTioleadoition,
Once DPI NT is redesiqned to meet the needs of the
usersf as stated in tho results^ additional exDeriments
should oe conducted fo Teas u re ad-iitional caoabilities of
the a \ n . This e^oeriment dio not consiaer whether a better
decision was heinf] made. This is not an easy problem and
further researci^ ano exoenimentation is called for,
Another area for exoerimentation has to do with the
are-^ of rearet values. QPp^lT currently is desianecl to
handle r^afets rather than gains. Some subjects casually
stated they i^iaht have oreferreri to use gains rather than
rearets. Additional experiments to oetermine if the use of
Gains vice regrets has an impact on user efficiency is
definitely calleo for.
Finallvf thouoht Should he niven to orovidinq a hard
cooy ootion to users who have only a soft copy (CRT)
capability. Further exoerimentation could be done to
determine if potential users want or even need a hard cooy
caoabi 1 i ty.
The underlying premise of these results is tnat most of
the trouble encountered in netting computers used in
decision maKino comes from too much emohasis on bits and
85

bvtes ann Tiini-r^al attention on the user. The use of
decision suncort systems such as I'PI'iT, o-ff^r gn oonort unity
th^t is both trivia) ana itmense. It is iTrrense in that
they can e^iopri the ccnp uter in decision rrakina activities
where larqe oavo^fs could be orovided and trivial in that
they represent no major advance in technology. Ruildinq
innovative svste'r'S will be a difficult and ris^y venture for
some tirne to co'T^e. The future of decision suooort systems
anri ooerational decision aiis deoends on some adjustments
that both trie develocers and users must maice. 6ut these
adjus'^ments ^r ° smaM ones; and i^re mainly attitudinal.
Little nevv kno^leaae is required. But the oooortunities are
all substantial/ a^.i t^e oersonal "^nd organizational rewards
h i oh ,
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APPEMQIX A - SAMPLE OPrm SESSION
% o o i n t
1) Ann Arbor
(?) Any harclc OP y
3) AO.M 3 A
Which terrrinal tyoe are you usina? 2
Please select one of the followinq ootions.
OPTIO^!
1 Disclav results
2 Edit Ti o >:' e 1
3 Sensitivity
^ Loa-i To.:Jel
5 Create or aJd to model




Is this a new TiodelTCy or n):y
Please enter a title for this n^odel: [air reconnaissance ]
A'hich Dortion of the model woula you like to create?
OPTION
1 Generate influence iiaaram
? Generate value/rearet model
3 Aid Bavsian indicators
^ Return to main menu
Enter desired ootionM
v'jhat is the m^in event of interest? [korean intent ]
korean intent
1- [ }
Please enter the outcome lacels for the event you have
called korean intent
Enter outcome label: [no action 1
Enter outcome labelt [harassmpntl
Enter outcome label: [shoot sown]
Enter outcome label: f J
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Please enter the oroh^oilty of each outco-^e of the
event vou have laoele-i korean intent
no action harass^entshcot down
-bO 30 lu
iMcr-Tigl i ze^:! va 1 ues
:
oO.O 5<">.0 10.0
Tf these values arp correct tyoe go: [aol
/•jhich Dortion of the model would you li<e to create?
OPTION
1 Generate influence diagram
2 Generate value/reoret model
5 Advd Bavsian indicators
^ Peturn to main t, enu
Enter desired opt-ion:,?
fou will be asked to orovide the criterion to he used
in your value juoriement, the actions you ^ay ta^e^ ano
the associated value/reoret matrices for each criterion
Please oress return to cont-inue.
Enter the names ^or each of your criterion:
Cri terion:
















[ do nn t fly ]
[modified route 1
[amed escort 1
[hiqh cerf a/c 1
[normal mission 1
[ ]
You will now be asked to orovide the values for
each of these value matrices.
Please oress return to continue.
Please enter regret/value matrix for
ai rcraft-ai rcrew
no action h a r
a
ssmen t shod t down
do not fly 0--
do not f 1
y
0.0 0.0 0.0
If these values are correct tvoe ao: [gol
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morfiHe^") route -2 -ol^ -------- — ---__-
modifieorout-e O.n -2 0.0 -6 0.0
T^ these values are correct ^voe oo: [qol
ar^ied escort -15 -55
ar^edescort 0.0 -15.0 -35.0
It these values are correct tyoe qo: [qo)
hiqh oerf a/c -5 -15
hiah perf a/c 0.0 -5.0 -15.0
If these values are correct tvoe qo: f. qo]
normal Tiission -<^5 -10 0---
norTialfnission 0,0 -25.0 -UHJ.O
If these values are correct tvoe qo: fool
P 1 e a s <= ent^r rea^e t / va 1 ue "natrix for
current information
no action harassfT'entshoot aown
do not fly -100 -100 -100
do not fly -100.0 -100.0 -lOu.O
If these values are correct tyoe go: [qol
nodifieTi route -50 -50 -50
rn o d i f i e d r o u t e -30.0 -50.0 - 3 u .
If these values are correct type go: Tool
armed escort -5 -5 -5
armedescort -'^.O -5,0 -5.0
If these values are correct tvpe qo
:
(qol
hiqh oerf a/c -50 -50 -50
hiqh oerf a/c -50.0 -50.0 -50.0
If these values are correct tyoe qo: [qol
normal mission -100 -------- --------
normal mission 0.0 0.0 -100.0
If these values are correct tyoe qo: (qol
Please enter reqret/value matrix for
national influence
no action harassmentshoot down
do not fly -50 -100 -70
do not fly -5 0.0 -1 00.0 -70.0
If these values are correct type oo: [qol
modified route -20 -20 -50------ ---— ---
modifie:! route -20.0 -2 0.0 -50.0
If these values are correct tvoe qo: lao)
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aPTied escort --iO ------__ -«_«-«-_
a r n e d e s c o r t - a . 0.0 0.0
I * these values are correct tyoe ao: [qo]
hiah no r f a/c -PS -li) -10
hiqhcerfa/c -25. -10.0 -10.0
If these values are correct tyoe qo: [aol
normal Tiission -2S -10 0------- --------
nortial mission o.O -25.0 -10 0.0
If these values are correct" tvoe oot [qol
Please enter reqret/value matrix for
reconnaissance oroo
no action i-iarassmentshoot ':!own
do not fly -100 -100 -100
do no t f 1
y
-10 0.0 -100.0 -100.0
If these values are correct tyoe oo : [qol
modified route -70 -50 -50
modified route -7(J.0 -50.0 -50.0
If these values are correct tvpe qot [qol
armed escort n o-- -------- --------
armedescort 0.0 0.0 0.0
If th^se values are correct tyoe qo: [qol
hioh oerf a/c -10 -10 -10
hiqhperfa/c -10.0 -10.0 -10.0
If these values are correct tyoe go: [oo]
normal mission -10 -70 -80------ --------
normal mission -10.0 -70.0 -80.0
If these values are correct tyoe oo: (ool
Please enter a set of importance weights for these criterion




wts: 100 10 5 30
Norm: 5«.B 5.^ 17.6 17.6
If these values are correct type oo: [qol
i/vhich Dortion of the model would you like to create?
OPTION
1 Generate influence diaoram
2 Generate value/reqret model
5 Add Baysian indicators




Please se1(=»ct one of the followina ootions
OPTiori
1 Disr)1=!v result's
2 Eo i t Tio^e 1
3 Sensitivity
'4 Load m o -1 e 1






























3 Event liwelih ood
^ Va 1 ues
5 Value weights
6 Influence diaoram
7 Return to main menu
Enter desirei ootion:2
Comb 1 ned Value
no action h a ra s smen t shoo t down
do not fiv -3?.^ -ai.2 -35.9
modified route -17.6 -25.9 -5'i.7
armed escort -7. a -9.1 -20.
«
hiqh oerf a/c -9.1 -9.4 -15.3
normal mission -1.8 -51,5 -96.5
Please press return to continue.
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5 Value we i oh t s
o Inflijence rjiaoram
7 Ret'urn to main rnenu
Enter desired ootion:7
select one o^ the followinq options
DiSD)av results
Edit Ti o a e 1
Sensitivity
Load Todel
Create or add to .Todel




one of the followinq:
Event orot'ability thresholds
value weiaht thresholds


















'/Ihich event outco^rie likelihood should be varien?
OPT \{^H
1 no action











10 2 30 ao 50 60 70 80 ^0 100
-39 -38 -37 -37 -3^ -35 -3^ -3'4 -33 -3^ -31
-32 -31 -29 -27 -26 -2^ -23 -21 -20 -IB -17
-11 -11 -10*-10* -"5* -9* -8* -8* -7* -7 -6
-10*-10*-10*-10*-1 -10 -10 -10 -« -9 -9
-a2 -38 -3^ -50 -2b -22 -18 -la -10 -b* -2*
Please oress return to continue.
Select one of tf^e folio wina:
nPTIO'j
1 Event orobability thresholds
2 Value weight thresholds
^2

5 Return to main menu
Enter desired ootion:3
Please select one of the followina ooticns









Edit T o n e
1
Sensitivity
Load T o a e









3 Sens i t i V i t y
U Load model







APPEf-;OlX R - SA'VipLE SCEMAPI05
ci;ban blockade sce^jario
On 25 ^i^rch 198 0, ohotoargnhs receiver from rnilitary
surveillance aircraft showed the existence of new
construction alnnq the south»^rn coast of Cuoa. Intelligence
analysts believe th^ construction to be a new major Soviet
nuclear suhmgrine suooort oase. however, they are undecirjed
as to wnether it will be caoable of resunclyinq only nuclear
fuel or botn nuclear fuel and nuclear SLH '^' m i s s i 1 e s .
Additional intelliaence from other sources has revealed
the cresence of hundreds of new technicians in the area. In
resconse to A-nerican inquiries, the Soviets have stated that
j-hey are merely neloina the Cubans build a new merchant
oort. They claim the technicians will leave as soon as the
Dort is comoleted.
v^ost US ooservers are hiohly concerned over these new
develonments. They feel the oresense of a new oort, caoaole
ot nuclear retrofit for Soviet submarines, has a serious
imoact on US national security. No lonqer would the Soviet
submarines be reouired to return to home ports. They could
conceivably oatrol near our shores for unlimited periods of
time. If a nuclear var ever did break out, a missile
resuDoly base so near-by could be devastating.
Analysts oelieve the new construction is caused by the
oossibilitv of non-ratification of the new SALT Treaty.
They feel if the Treaty is not ratified, the Soviets will
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have a jumo in arT. s escalation anrj the US will have no oower
to interfpra. The =inalvsts also Delieve that if the Treaty
is ratifieif the construction will auickly cease.
On the 'T'orninq of 2 7 ^''arch/ three Soviet shios were
rjetectec) sailino towards Cuba. Reconnaissance has revealed
one to oe a freiahterr one an arrred escort destrover^ and
the last an escort submarine. Intelligence sources in the
Soviet Union have sai"i the freighter is carryina the first
suonly o^ nuclear fuel and -nay oossibly be also carrying
SLR>^' s.
Fears that the Soviets may oe trying to guic*<ly
establish a strongholri in Cuba oromnteo the President to
order a tnree ship Task Force to intercept the Soviet
freighter, fhe mission of the Task' Force is to determine if
nuclear suoolies of ar^y tyoe are on board/ ana if so* to
detain it awaiting further instructions.
The Soviets immediately resoonded by statina they would
absolutely deny any boarding of the freighter and any such
action would be net by 'military retaliation. Intelligence
has also revealed the ordering of at least ten Soviet
submarines into the area and the rapid augmentation of its
Atlantic Force.
The President has decided he can not allow nuclear
supplies to reach Cuba and he feels a blockade of some tyoe
must be placed around Cuba. He immediately olaced the
Atlantic Fleet on alert and ordered them to begin steaming




Tne tyce =\nd 5i?e o'^ blockade has not vet been
deterTineci. The President has asked you for your
recomTema^'ion, 1he President scecifically wants a
recoTiTenda t i on as to whether a total olockacJe of all
shiDoinqr a nnodified blockaoe of soTie sort allowing merchant
shiDS carryina non-military carao to pasSf or a roving
oatrol which .^oul'i only detain ships carrying military
hardware.
Derations oersonnel have stated it would reguire the
entire (Atlantic Fleet ano halt of the '^'editerranean Fleet to
invoke a total blockade. A modified blockade would reguire
only the Atlantic Fleet while the roving oatrol would only
neec:i half of the ^^tlantic Fleet resources.
Intelliaence analysts are unsure what the Soviet
intentions will be concernina the situation. They believe
thpir ootions to be one of three:
1. An attack of the blockading forces.
2. An attemot to run through the blockade without
initiatina any aaoression* or
3. SubTnission to the blockade. This means the
Soviets may relent to having some shios searched
but may havp others return directly home.
They agrees howeverr that two upcoming events will
help to cietermine their motives. The impendina vote on
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fnp SALT Treatv and final determination of exactly
wnat tvop of construction is heina aone on the coast ara the
kev issues in assessina their intentions. In adaitioof
they feel i^e S'-'>LT Treaty vote will he effected by noth US
oublic ooinion concernina the Treaty and current world
ODinion concerninq the situation. The UM Security council
is scheduled to rreet in two days to discuss the si'iuation.
The analysts have assessed the oronahility of US oublic
ooinion DeinT oro-S-^LT as 70% and anti-S/^LT as being 30%,
/lorld ooinion is ass'=ssed as havinq a ^0% chance of being
oro-US» iO'i oro-Soviet/ and 30% of oeing neutral. The
analysts also currently aaree to a 60% likelihooo of the
construction beino to suooort full nuclear resuooly^ 30% for
only ^iaval resuonly (non-ar-Tannents)/ and 10% as a new
cornme re i a 1 do r t .
The items tne President wants considered in the
selection of a best course of action are (in order of





ational security. The president feels he can
not allow the Soviets to establish a suooly base
in Cuba ,
2) Safety of US .'Nationals currently in Cuba. The
US has recently beaun exportino numerous
commercial products to Cuba in an effort to
noost a sagging economy. At present/ it is




3) I'S oublic ooinion. This is an election year and
analysts feel there will be oublic outcry it ^e
force the Soviets into a military confrontation*
but the runlic will be impressed by strong
measures which force the Soviets into accepting
our demands.
^) Cuban reaction. The US has only recently begun
trade with Cuba ana is anxious to continue this
if at all possible. Any tyoe of blockade
imposed around Cuba will have a serious impact
on these trade agreements.
5) Aorld opinion. Any confrontation between the US
and U3SP is undesirable. If the US is
successful with the blockade* world opinion will
be high. However/ if we provoke aaaression by
our actions/ we will lose additional world






On S '"^rcn I'^BO/ an unar-ne'J '^'ohawk reconnaissance
aircraft aborted its Tiission oven Korea. It returned to its
base where t^e c^ew reoorted an interceotion oy a
fiqhter-tyoe aircraft from ivJorth Korea. The crew of the
unarmed '^ohawk- had not stayed around long enouah to
determine whether the intercepter was there to harass^
s^ootf icienrify, or had just "haooened along" while on a
routin'=> trainino fliaht. Another reconnaissance flight is
scheduled for tomorrow ana the commander needs a
recommendation concerning future fliahts.
After furtner discussion, the commander desires the
following oDtions evaluated in light of what has haooened
and what the intelligence staff conclude are North Korea's
intentions:
1. Do not fly into the area anymore.
2. Flv into the area on a modifiec:i route. This
modifieo route would be less sensitive but also
less oroductive in collection ootential.
5. Fly into the same area but now with an armed
escort .
a. Fly into the area with h i ah -oe r f o r mane
e
aircraft. The aircraft would be less vulnerable




5. f^lv a nor^nal '"ission; do no*" c^ anae ^nythinq
from previous fliahts.
jhe ccT^franaer is mostly concerned with the oossiole
less of the aircraft and crew durino the mission. However,
he is also concerned witS the loss of prestige or political
influence if fliohts were stoooert o <" altereci. The loss of
information ana the cossihle imoact n the reconnaissance
oro'^ram in otn<»r areas are also imoortant factors.
The intelliaence section believes it has assessed the
possible intentions of the Morth ^orean Government on future
j
flights. Sase'i on oast situations arin current capabilities/
thev feel there is onlv a slim chance (10 '4) the Koreans will
try to shoot future aircraft down, a m. o'lerate chance (30%)
they will harass, but orobably will do nothina (60%).
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iPPENOrx C - SA^"PLE QlltST IOMNAIf?tS






WnAT .vAS YOUR REC O^-iMENDE ACTIn^?
'."jHY DID YUU RECUN'^'E'lP THAT ACTIO^J?
PLEASE Ai\S.-.'ER THE F OLLCn I'lG QUESTIONS AS INDICATED.
1. Do vou feel this scenario was realistic? If no t nlease







2. /iere you anle •"o ilentify any non-essential inforTiation
r) urine your evaluation of the coijrses of action? If yes^




, Vie re you able 'o assess fhe criticality o '^ the factors
which contributen to the choice of the recommencied course
of action? If yes , which factors were the most critical?
a Yes
b. ^'o
^. Do you feel confident that your recommendation was tne





QUEST lUfiNi r'-?t FO^ TEA-' '-iE"^ieFPS





WHAT ''JA3 YQiJR RECOf.^--iEMOED ACTIUi\J?
I inHY DIO you PECOvmEMD TnAT ACTIOM?
PLEASE Ar^S.'^t-K TMe FULLO/jI'jG QUESTIOiJS AS INDICATED.
1. Do vcu fee] t^ ^ 9, scenario w^s realistic? If no, olease
co^'^ent in trie soace orovided.
a. Yes
b, iJO
? , '.Jere ycj aole to irj^nt-ify any non-essential infor'^^ation
during your ev-3lua*"ion of the courses of action? Tf yeS/
what was t'^at infor-nation?
a. Yas
h. Mo
3 . i-'.' ere yoLJ able to assess the criticality of the factors
which contributed to th^ choice o ^ the recc^nnended course
of action? If veSf which factors were the rrost critical?
a. Yes
b. No
^ , Do vou feel confident that your recorr.menciation was the







" 5. Did I'lPI'^lT nres<=nt the evaluat-ed data in a .manner which







6. Did nPI\iT disclay its results Quickly enouqh?
which disolavs were slow?
a. Yes
b . - J o
I f not ,
7. "as it easy tn make corrections i
comment on your oronlenis.
a. Yes
b. No
the model? If not/
8. Did OPT'JT recover well from any errors you micjht have
made? If not/ what was the result?
a. Yes
b . U
C, \i/A - I rlio not make any errors.
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QUtSTTQ^jNAl^E FIJP TEA'^i -^lEN'BEws AFTEP CG^'PLETT^JG HOTH SCENARIOS
M a '/ F :
p A .N| K :
TEA-! :i :
PLEASE AMSwER THE FOLLn/;lMG QUESTIOriS AS INDICATED.
1. To wf^at extent din OPIf'JT aid in your assessment O'^
what event was cioin:T to Haonen?
a. Confused
b . WO H e 1
n
c. Peii^^orceo own ideas
d. Clarified
e. EnliThtened
f. Had no neei to assess an event
2, To ^^at extent did OPP^'T aid in your decision process
for sel^ctina a course of action?
a. Innored
b. Relied upon it
c. Addecj confidence
d. ;"ias confusinq




'4. Do you think you would have performed better with or
without OPI^lT?
a . .^( i t h
b . i'; i t H o u t
lOa








6. Do VOU fe'^l decision 'r'a^ers shoulo use CPRiT^ or should
it be left to technical exoerts?
a. Decision '^ak'^rs
b. Technical exoerts
7 . '. hat do vou cerceive as oeina tne areatest advantage in
usina nPIlT?
8. '/^hat do you nerceive as heina the areatest disadvantage
in usinq OPI^JT?
9. '.'Joul'i vo'j use QPI'lT in the future if it was made
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